Tuesday, 9 August 2011

Competition Policy: Epic Fail?

One of my favourite economic bug-a-boos is forced competition in any market.  In Australia we are seemingly in-love with this false competition.  We regulate financial services, telecommunications, airlines and electricity quite heavily.  We also like to "enforce" competition in banking, transport and retail. Other than provide bureaucratic jobs in the regulatory bodies, does this do anything much for Australia overall?

Without actually doing a doctorate (or reading a whole one) on the topic myself, I suggest that elements of competition policy are inefficient and burdensome.  The National Competition Policy (NCP) reforms of the 1990s were wide ranging and largely beneficial to the Australian economy.  Those reforms were behind the corporatisation of many government businesses and the introduction of competition in energy and telecommunications among others.  It also created the ACCC - the so-called competition umpire.  I'm not going to pick on the NCP reforms but more on some of the outcomes and the actions of ACCC.

Let's take the tabloid's favourite market: groceries.  Woolworths and Wesfarmers dominate this area.  It is, contrary to popular belief, a competitive set of markets.  Coles and Woolworths have had to deal with competitors like Franklins and IGA and foreign antagonists such as Aldi and Costco.  Apparently when the two “big bullies” use their size to compete with smaller, local businesses, people don't want to enjoy the lower prices, they whinge about predatory pricing hurting the little guy.  Fact is: sometimes a market is only big enough for one and a half participants.  Think about the Australian airline industry through the 1990s.  There was always Qantas, but Ansett, Compass, Compass mark 2, then along came Virgin as the market grew and airlines reduced their cost base.  So when the market is reduced to a monopoly with monopoly profits, economic theory tends to hold up and another competitor will enter the market.  That’s why we got Compass airlines twice.

Another failure of competition policy is Telstra.  When Optus was given access as the initial competitor to Telstra, it boggles my mind that Optus agreed to enter the market when the natural monopoly part of the telecommunications industry – the copper wire – was owned and operated by the retail competitor.  The NCP recommends that regulation and ownership of non-contestable sections of an industry be regulated (or just run by government I think).  So Optus has always been behind the eight-ball.  The dream of Optus’ coaxial network competing with Telstra’s was stymied by local councils who didn’t like overhead cables.  Roughly 20 years later, I think most of Australia would agree that structural separation should have occurred before Optus and before privatisation with the network business probably being retained by the government.  Since this didn’t occur, Telstra shareholders have been screwed six ways from Sunday by successive governments and mostly the ACCC.  Telstra would have finished building the National Broadband Network had the ACCC not disallowed the pricing scheme Telstra wanted to use to allow its competitors access to the upgraded network.  So dual policy failure – Telstra shouldn’t have owned the network and with its Universal Service Obligation should have been allowed to get a commercial rate of return on its network investment.  Instead, we are now in the $40billion process of re-nationalising the country’s telecommunications backbone.

Bank bashing has almost become Australia’s pastime.  We forget however, that there is a massive, yet intangible barrier to entry for new players in the banking Industry: customer confidence.  Through the decade leading up to the Global Financial Crisis, we saw a massive increase in participants in banking services: GE money, ING, RAMS, Wizard, Citibank to name a few.  They mainly offered mortgages and credit cards.  The four pillars of Westpac, ANZ, NAB and CBA kept their profits up by finding new fees to charge customers.  Customers are reluctant to change financial institution for two main reasons: 1. in the electronic age, notifying all other institutions connected to a primary transaction account is difficult and time-consuming and 2. People won’t give their money to an institution they don’t trust or can’t access easily.  New players in banking take a long time to build up public trust.  With the four pillars policy rigidly in place, it takes new entrants and smaller players a long time to achieve the scale and consumer confidence to begin to impact on the degree and type of competition.  Without the four pillars there would be mergers amongst the big four banks and this would create niches and points of difference that foreign or regional banks could exploit.  My answer to your “too big to fail” argument is to either keep banks as banks or force all financial institutions to offer all financial services in some way.  Personally I think keeping banks as banks and not insurance companies or fund managers or stock brokers is the best way.

Lastly, in competitions like the lottery, war, sport or pass the parcel, there is a winner.  Why can’t a market have a winner?  Why regulate and bureaucratise on the off chance someone wins before market conditions change?  Remember the Microsoft anti-trust lawsuit involving bundling windows and Internet explorer?  It went on for so long that by the time there was an outcome it didn’t matter anymore.  So Microsoft won the initial browser competition only to be gazumped by open source and google.  Markets change, annoying government interventions change, consumers change and technology changes.  The lesson here as in the four examples at the top of the paragraph is that victory is fleeting and staying on top for any length of time is impossible, so why force competition?

Captain America = shit

So what's wrong with another comic book hero hitting the big screen?  Everything if it's as bad as this particular piece of hollywood trash.

After the joys of The Punisher, DareDevil and Electra to name a few, I suppose I shouldn't be surprised that comic book characters can be become awful movies.

At some stage in a either a high school drama or english class, I learned that the success of fiction is based on 'the willing suspension of disbelief' on the part of the audience.  It is the job of the writer/director/actors to keep the audience in this state of mind.  I lost it about five minutes after yet another american hero took drugs to improve his performance.  It wasn't when he was chasing - and catching - cars.  It was when the guy he was chasing got into the nazi bat-sub in Queens, New York.

The suspension of disbelief came back for a little while after that as the captain sold bonds and did USO shows.  But and I should have known there would always be a but, almost everything about Hydra was in no way believable in the context set up in the first 30mins of the movie.  If you set up a movie in the context of World War 2, then you can only extend reality so far before it becomes ridiculous.  So Hydra has super weapons - fine.  That the US captures them and then doesn't use them is not!  Hydra turns on the Nazis and there are no reprisals?  Ernst Rohm's ghost will tell you that doesn't happen.  And so it continued.

Personally, I have severe struggles with movies set in the past that have technology we don't yet have today.  I hated League of distinguished Gentlemen for this reason.  Captain America suffers many of the same problems. 

Add to the plethora of implausibles a by-the-numbers script.  If you ever watch this movie, at the start of each scene guess the outcome - 99% of the time you'll be right if you've seen a few action movies before.  The love interest getting used as a hostage is probably the only part of a stock standard action flick missing.

On a happier note, the two veterans in the cast - Tommy Lee Jones and Hugo Weaving - were both pretty good in their roles.  Chris Evans and his CGI buddies did ok too.

Sunday, 7 August 2011

High Speed Rail - what is the deal?

Firstly I must state two important facts about East Coast High Speed Rail in Australia:
  1. I am a massive fan of High Speed Trains.  Having ridden Fast and Very Fast trains on three continents, it is my preferred mode of travel.
  2. This week the government released a preliminary report which was designed to inform and scope a detailed (probably all the way to a business-case) final report.
Due to the combined facts that the news in this country has next to nothing to talk about (car crashes - woo!) and tend to barrack for the ALP, you would have found it hard to miss this story over the past couple of days.  As usual, it seems that the journalists read only the executive summary before filing a story.  All the stories just quoted the biggest figure they could find to finance the project and potential travel times and prices.  Little mention of what route it would actually take or that the ticket prices used in the analysis were based on current low-cost airfares or existing rail fares.  I will now attempt an unbiased summary of the salient points in about 500 words.  I may fail both.

The study broke the Melbourne to Brisbane journey into four parts:
  • Melbourne to Canberra
  • Canberra to Sydney
  • Sydney to Newcastle (the subject of a greater detail sub-study)
  • Newcastle to Brisbane
Potential routes for the high speed railway were examined for each segment.  There were about 20 potential routes examined and some were straight-line and impractical, but served as a good basis for comparison.

The study of these routes was done in two phases - an initial high level one to weed out some of the poorer options and then a second, more refined study of the remaining choices.  Options were examined based on construction costs including likely tunneling and bridging, patron catchments, land acquisition costs and environmental sensitivity.  Existing transport corridors and government development plans also played a major role.

The report estimates that an HST would be a viable operation with the potential for a profit-making enterprise to cover operating and maintenance costs.  But, it's the fourth paragraph of the report that is the shortest and most damning:
"International experience suggests it is unrealistic to expect the capital cost of a HSR network to be fully recovered"
Which is both true and not true.  The capital costs will not be fully recovered in dollars, but in less tangible ways like time savings, productivity gains, or accelerated growth in towns serviced by the HSR network.  These benefits are real and estimated in the report, but also unlikely to be able to fully make up for the dollar costs over the study period (2036-2056).  Then again, Melbourne and Sydney’s metropolitan railways were built largely in the 1880s and we’re still getting the intangible benefits from them.

Whilst I write this summary I had better not that it includes capital costs only.  By that it means:  “The risk-adjusted cost estimates include land acquisition, stations and city access, maintenance and stabling facilities, power infrastructure, civil and rail infrastructure and IT and ticketing systems. They exclude client planning and procurement management costs, which are likely to be in the order of 10 to 15 per cent of the estimate.”  They also in no way cover operating costs like train leases and electricity.  
Cutting to the chase, to build the whole thing based on these broad estimates will cost between $61 billion and $110 billion.  This sounds like heaps which it is and it isn’t.  Labour costs a lot in Australia, as does land in inner city areas plus you're dealing with some remote and sensitive areas between major cities.  Also the $110b equates to a 90% probability of completion within budget (ie P90 in the table below).  Maybe given current labour laws and government it is best to use this figure only?
Segment

Length
Stations
Risk Adjusted Cost Est ($2011b)

Corridor Name
 (km)

P10
 P50
 P90
Brisbane to Newcastle






3 Direct Corridor (via Beaudesert)
676
4
$21.7
$28.9
$35.9

3a Direct Corridor (via Gold Coast)
701
5
$24.9
$32.6
$40.6

4 Coastal Corridor (via Beaudesert)
701
7
$20.0
$23.8
$27.8

5 Coastal Corridor (via Gold Coast)
706
8
$22.2
$26.9
$31.7
Newcastle to Sydney






8 Central Coast Corridor
120
4
$10.7
$14.2
$17.9
Sydney to Canberra






 11 Hume Highway Corridor (via Southern Highlands)
271
4
$10.9
$15.1
$19.2

12 Princes Highway Corridor (via Wollongong and Southern Highlands)
290
5
$15.0
$19.8
$24.5
Canberra to Melbourne






 14a Hume Highway Corridor (via Wagga Wagga and Albury-Wodonga)
552
4
$19.5
$22.4
$25.6







Brisbane to Melbourne (totals)






Best route (5,8,11,14a)
1649
20
$63.3
$78.6
$94.4

cheapest (4,8,11,14a)
1644
19
$61.1
$75.5
$90.5

dearest (3a,8,12,14a)
1663
18
$70.1
$89.0
$108.6

You can get the reports at:
Another opinion:

Wednesday, 3 August 2011

How I chose my next phone

Just in case you were unaware: I hate Apple.  I've only ever owned one of their products, an iphone 3GS.  For the past six months I've been counting down the days to the end of the contract on that phone.  Why?  Well I hate Apple's pretentious advertising.  I hate itunes - it knows too much about me; what I like and dislike, where I live, my credit card details, and who knows what else!!  itunes also has a very long and complicated user agreement that seems to change every 2-3 weeks.  I don't trust contracts that change all the time, without my input.  Oh and my piece of crap iphone has a tendency to crap out three minutes into most phone calls.

So quite a while ago I decided that my next phone would definitely not be an Apple: it would be either a Samsung or an HTC.  HTC lost my vote when they put the Desire HD exclusively on the Vodaphone "network".  Thus I have spent the past week or two looking at what sort of deals would be available for the Samsung Galaxy S2 which is their latest and greatest offering.

On the back of this comparative work I have further bad news for those of you with Telstra shares in your bottom drawer.  Telstra indisputably has the best mobile network in Australia, but it is not worth a $15 a month premium over the Optus offer.  For a base of $59 a month the call and message rates are the same on both networks.  Optus offers more data per month, but Telstra has better coverage and the Next G network has data transfer rates that in places far exceed anything Optus even plans to offer.

When you think about what you use the data on your phone for mostly - footy scores, stick a photo on facebook or solve an argument using wikipedia - you just don't need the super network.  Certainly not at such a high cost per month.  Optus wins this round.  Telstra had better find some features to make the next G network worth the extra money or their fixed line business won't be only one receding at a great rate of knots.


Telstra deal:
http://www.telstra.com.au/shop/Consumer/NGTSOMobilePhonesView?catalogId=10101&storeId=10001&productId=109229&langId=-1&categoryId=16103&parent_category_rn=16103&top_category=&ti=TR:TR:July11:samgalaxys2:mobileselect:buynow

Optus deal:
http://www.optus.com.au/store/phone/galaxysii?sid=MobAFeat1:galaxysii:OSC:MPOST:OCA:MPOST:22062011#a_selectaplan